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Abstract  
This paper develops a method for the 
quantitative analysis of network connectivity in the 
presence of both permanent and transient faults. Even 
though transient noise is considered a common 
occurrence in networks, a survey of the literature 
reveals an emphasis on permanent faults.  Transient 
faults introduce a time element into the analysis of 
network reliability. With permanent faults it is 
sufficient to consider the faults that have accumulated 
by the end of the operating period. With transient 
faults the arrival and recovery time must be included. 
The number and location of faults in the system is a 
dynamic variable. Transient faults also introduce 
system recovery into the analysis. 
Introduction 
The goal is the quantitative assessment of 
network connectivity in the presence of both 
permanent and transient faults.  The approach is to 
construct a global model that includes all classes of 
faults: permanent, transient, independent, and 
correlated.  A theorem is derived about this model 
that give distributions for (1) the number of fault 
occurrences, (2) the type of fault occurrence, (3) the 
time of the fault occurrences, and (4) the location of 
the fault occurrence.  These results are applied to 
compare and contrast the connectivity of different 
network architectures in the presence of permanent, 
transient, independent, and correlated faults.  The 
examples below use a Monte Carlo simulation, but 
the theorem mentioned above could be used to guide 
fault-injections in a laboratory.        
    Network performance in the presence of 
transients has been extensively studied.  In [I], the 
authors stress the importance of considering both 
permanent and transient faults in a dependability 
analysis of a network. They conduct a failure-modes-
and-effects analysis using 2080 transient fault 
injections in the host interface of a selected network. 
In [2], the authors propose a design to provide a 
transparent self-healing network that handles both 
permanent and transient faults. The goal is a system 
that continues to meet hard deadlines in the presence 
of fault occurrence. In [3], the authors describe an 
embedded system for real time control that uses error 
detection and cyclic operation to guard against 
permanent and transient faults. The goal is a system 
with a very high safety level.  In [4], the authors 
present a comparative analysis of transient fault-
tolerant techniques including end-to-end, node-by-
node, and stochastic communication, but there is no 
quantitative assessment of reliability.   In [5], the 
author studies masking the effects of transient faults.  
In [6], the authors study fault-tolerant cache 
coherence protocols that ensure the correct execution 
of programs when not all messages are correctly 
delivered. 
    The major difference between this paper and 
the papers referenced above is that this paper 
develops a method of quantitative assessment, but the 
results of this paper integrate well with the previous 
advances in the field.  The results of a failure-modes-
and-effects analysis (as in [l]) would be used as a 
model for system recovery that is a part of the 
quantitative assessment.  This assessment method 
would be used to check the effectiveness of various 
proposed designs (as in [2] and [3]).  The theorems 
below offer the possibility of putting this type of 
work (as in [4] and [5]) on a quantitative basis.  More 
efficient methods (as in [6]) could be used to 
efficiently apply the methods below to larger 
networks. 
    The next section introduces a global fault 
model and proves the basic theorem about fault 
occurrence.  The following section demonstrates fault 
occurrence can be considered in terms of three, 
independent, well-known distributions.  The 
following section considers two complex networks 
and computes their connectivity under several fault 
conditions.  
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Figure 1. Global Fault Occurrence Model
 
The Global Fault Model 
Faults are either permanent or transient.  They 
are either independent or correlated in space or time 
or both.  Suppose a certain system operating in a 
certain environment has  m  types of fault events, and 
event type  j  occurs at rate  α j .  Let  α  = α 1 + … + α m . 
The global model for precisely n faults occurring 
during an operating period is given in figure 1, which 
displays all possible sequences of  n  fault events  
The global model for precisely n faults occurring 
during an operating period is given in figure 1, which 
displays all possible sequences of  n  fault events 
The fan out from state  S0  includes all m classes 
of faults. The fan out from all the intermediate states 
is the same as the fan out from state S0 .  There are 
n+2 columns beginning with column 0 and ending 
with column  n+l.  The first and last columns have a 
single row. The number of faults that have occurred 
corresponds to the column number. The process 
begins in state S0 and ends in one of the states in the 
nth column.  The final state Sn+1  is included because 
the specification that precisely n faults have occurred 
(during the operating period) is expressed 
mathematically by requiring that the process reaches 
the nth column during the operating period, but the 
transition into Sn+1  does not occur until after the 
operating period. 
 
 
 
    Obviously, if figure 1 is the fault occurrence 
model, then a device can collect several faults during 
an operating period.  This phenomenon must be 
suitably interpreted during a simulation or laboratory 
fault-injection.  If a component has already collected 
a permanent fault, then subsequent fault occurrences 
can be ignored. If a component has had previous 
transient fault occurrences, then a permanent fault 
renders it permanently faulty. Multiple transient fault 
occurrences are isolated if the component recovers 
from the previous transient before the next occurs.  In 
a simulation or fault-injection experiment, an isolated 
transient is treated as if the others had not occurred.  
If transient faults occur while others are in the 
system, the simulation or experiment will have to 
observe system recovery from all the transient faults 
present. 
    The derivation of the formula for fault 
occurrence requires some bookkeeping.  Suppose  k i  
faults of type  i   (i = 1,..., m)  with   n = k 1 + ... + k m 
have occurred in some specified order, and let   j  be 
the rate of the  j
th
   fault (j=1,..., n).  We have, 
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and   =  1 + ... +  m .  The probability that the  n  
designated faults occur in the designated order and 
that the  j
th
  fault occurs before time  s j  is given by 
the convolution integrals below. 
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This last expression is the occurrence probability 
for precisely  n  faults of  a specified type and 
location in a specified order at specified times. 
    Expression (2) does not depend on the 
specified order of the faults.  Since any ordering 
yields the same probability, all orderings are equally 
likely.  Hence, the occurrence probability for 
precisely  n  faults of specified type and location at 
specified times in any order whatsoever is  
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Interpretation of the Fault Occurrence 
Formula 
This section shows how to choose the number, 
occurrence time, type, and location of the faults for a 
trial (representing one operating period) in the 
experiment based on the result in the previous 
section.  The first subsection presents a standard 
result, and the next three sections present the three 
distributions used to interpret the result in the 
previous section. 
Competing Constant Rate Events 
Suppose there are  m  events each with rate   i  
as depicted in figure 2.  These events represent all 
possible fault occurrences. 
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Figure 2. The Fan-Out for Fault Occurrence 
For the model in figure 2, the probability that 
event  i  has occurred given some event has occurred 
is [7] 
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The Poisson distribution 
The Poisson distribution is a renewal process 
that occurs at a constant rate.  The model with rate    
is given in figure 3. 
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 Figure 3. The Poisson Renewal Process 
For the model in figure 3, the probability of 
being in state  k  at time  T  is [7] 
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As mentioned in the section above, the fault 
injection procedure will have to be adapted to the 
assumption of a constant rate used by the Poisson 
process. If the system removes failed components, 
the failure rate of the system does not remain 
constant.  One method of handling this is to treat the 
removed components as virtual components.  This 
means that the component is theoretically subject to 
later fault injections, but in practice these faults will 
not be injected if the system has already removed the 
component.  If the system has not yet removed the 
faulty component, then the second fault can be 
injected into the same component.  This double 
injection checks that the occurrence of a second fault 
does not interfere with the detection and removal of a 
faulty component 
The Ordered Uniform Distribution 
Choose a sample of size  n  ( x 1 , x 2 , ... , x n ) 
from the uniform distribution on the interval [0 T].  
Order it as  n)2)1) xxx (((   .  The 
distribution 
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is called the ordered uniform distribution [7]. 
 
The Mutinomial Distribution 
Suppose we sample with replacement from a 
population with  m  classes of objects.  Suppose the 
probability of choosing an object from class  i  is  pi .  
For a sample of size  n  the probability of choosing  ki  
objects from class  i  (i=1,...,n)  is [7]. 
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In particular, if the class of objects is the set of 
faults given in figure 1 then the probability of  k j  
faults of type  j  occurring given  n  faults have 
occurred is given by the expression  
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where  m1   .  In the formulas (8) and (9) 
some of the  k  j’s  can be zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4. A Four-by-Four-by-Four Planar Array  
 
The Fault Injection Procedure 
The expression (3) is the probability that 
precisely  n  faults of some specified types have 
occurred at some specified times in an operating 
period of the system.  The expression (3) (and hence 
the probability) is algebraically equivalent to a 
product of three probability distributions as given in 
expression (9).  The multiplicative property implies 
these three distributions act independently. 
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The three distributions (in order) are the Poisson 
renewal process, the ordered uniform, and the 
multinomial distribution.  Since they act 
independently, the faults for any trial (representing 
one operating period) can be chosen in the following 
three steps. 
 
(1) The number of faults is given by the Poisson 
with rate the sum of all fault occurrence 
rates. 
(2) The occurrence times are given by the 
ordered uniform.  
(3) At each occurrence time, the location and 
type of fault is chosen by a random sample 
(without replacement, according to 
occurrence probability) from the set of faults. 
 
Connectivity Example 
We consider a two-dimensional and a three-
dimensional planar array.  The examples have the 
same number of nodes, an eight-by-eight and a four-
by-four-by-four, although they have a different 
number of links: 128 and 192, respectively.  A four-
by-four-by-four planar array is depicted in figure 4.  
The connectivity for a two-dimensional four-by-four 
is given by the first 16 nodes and the links connecting 
them.   
 Independent node and link failures can be either 
permanent or transient.  For this example, faults 
correlated in space are all transient faults, and they 
are node-centric with a correlated fault bringing 
down a node, a group of adjacent nodes, and the 
connecting links.  There are two levels of severity for 
faults correlated in space.  For a two-dimensional 
array, a fault of severity level one brings down a node 
and the four adjacent nodes along with the associated 
14 links.  A fault of severity level  two brings down a 
node and the eight adjacent nodes along with the 
associated 24 links.  These faults are shown in figures 
5 and 6.  Level one and two faults in a three-
dimensional array bring down 7 and 27 nodes 
respectively along with the associated links. 
 
 
 
             
  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Correlated Fault of Severity One  
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Correlated Fault of Severity Two  
 
We also consider faults correlated in time, and 
for this study, they are treated as arising from 
external phenomena that also cause correlation in 
space.  For these computations, we assume they are 
transient faults of severity level one that repeatedly 
hit the same collection of nodes.  The number of 
repeated hits is given by a Poisson distribution, and 
their occurrence times are given by an exponential 
distribution. 
    We give the systems a long operating time of 
more than 10 years.  The nodes are assumed simple 
(perhaps computers on a chip) and highly reliable.  
The node transient failure rate is a magnitude larger 
than the node permanent failure rate.  The links are 
simpler pieces of hardware, but they are more 
exposed.  Their permanent failure rate is equal to the 
node permanent failure rate, and their transient 
failure rate is an order of magnitude greater than their 
permanent rate.  The correlated-in-space rates are 
proportional to the number of links in the system.  
The correlated-in-time faults average two additional 
hits, and the additional hits occur quickly.  In this 
first study, the transient recovery times for all types 
of transient faults are equal.  
    The operating time and failure rates for the 
computations are 
Operating time  = 100,000 hours 
Node permanent = 1e-6/hour 
        Node transient = 1e-5/hour 
Link permanent = 1e-6/hour 
Link transient  = 1e-5/hour 
Correlated level one for two dimensional 
      = 1.28e-4/hour 
Correlated level two for two dimensional 
      = 6.4e-5/hour 
Correlated level one for three dimensional 
      = 1.92e-4/hour 
Correlated level two for three dimensional 
      = 9.6e-5/hour 
Occurrence rate for two-dimensional 
       time dependent faults = 6.4e-5/hour  
Occurrence rate for three-dimensional 
      time dependent faults = 9.6e-5/hour  
 
Possion parameter for time dependent  
     faults = 2 
Exponential rate for time dependent  
     faults = 3.6e+4/hour 
Recovery time for transients = 1 second. 
 
Table 1 gives the failure frequencies and 95% 
confidence intervals for two and three dimensional 
planar arrays when the number of trials is 10,000 for 
each fault scenario. 
Summary and Further work 
This paper derives a result about fault 
occurrence in a global fault model where the faults 
appear at a constant rate.  A fault can be permanent 
or transient.  It can be independent or correlated in 
space or time or both.  Additional analysis shows this 
basic result on fault occurrence can be written as the 
product of three, well-known distributions, which 
renders it convenient for fault injection experiments.  
The examples demonstrate applying the result to all 
possible classes of faults: permanent or transient and 
independent or correlated in space or time or both.     
    In addition to connectivity, there are a number 
of other elements that can now be examined 
quantitatively.  There is the study of the detection and 
identification of faults with rerouting of messages.  
There is the comparison of architectures and 
protocols in different operating environments, and 
there is sensitivity analysis to guide the design of 
systems and the gathering of field data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Statistics of Fault Injection  
 
Fault Types 
Present 
Eight-by-
Eight 
Four 
-by- 
Four 
-by- 
Four 
Node perm  52 
 [38, 66] 
 0 
[0, 3] 
Node tran   0 
 [0, 3] 
 0 
 [0, 3] 
Node perm 
Node tran 
431 
 [391, 471] 
 4 
[0, 8] 
Link perm  42 
 [29, 55] 
 1 
 [0, 3] 
Link tran  0 
 [0, 3] 
  0 
 [0,3] 
Link perm 
Link tran 
 470 
 [429, 511] 
2 
 [0, 5] 
Node per 
Node tran 
Link perm 
Link tran 
 3674 
[3579, 
3768] 
 177 
[151, 203] 
Node perm 
Node tran 
Link perm 
Link tran 
Correlated type 1 
5881 
 [5784, 
5978] 
382 
 [344, 420] 
Node perm 
Node tran 
Link perm 
Link tran 
Correlated type 1 
Correlated type 2 
 5905  
[5808, 
6001] 
470 
[428, 511] 
Node perm 
Node tran 
Link perm 
Link tran 
Correlated type 1 
Correlated type 2 
Time correlated 
 6534 
[6441, 
6627] 
 641 
[593, 689] 
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